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COMMUNITY SYNDICALISM FOR THE UNITED STATES:
DEMOCRATIC PRODUCTION IN RESISTING HEGEMONIC
GLOBALIZATION AND LAW
BY
KENNETH M. CASEBEER*

The economic renewal will be moral or it will not exist. The moral
revolution will be economic or it will not take place.
Don Jose Maria Arizmendiarrieta**
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I. INTRODUCTION

Economic globalization is a fact and material condition of
modern society. There will be no going back to purely local
economies. At the same time, the future of participatory democracy
depends upon "localizing" leverage within this global market.
Otherwise community autonomy will be ephemeral.

* Prof. of Law Emeritus, University of Miami Law School. I am indebted to the work of
Staughton Lynd, Alan Hyde, David Ellerman, and Peter Pitegoff, and as always, the support of
Marnie Mahoney. The ideas were first presented at the Conference on: The Social Economy,
Corporate Responsibility, and Workers' Rights and Cooperatives, International Institute for the
Sociology of Law, Onati, Spain, July 2011.
** Founder of Mondragon Cooperatives, Basque, Spain, quoted in WILLIAM FOOTE
WHYTE & KATHLEEN KING WHYTE, MAKING MONDRAGON: THE GROWTH AND DYNAMICS
OF THE WORKER COOPERATIVE COMPLEX (1991).
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Temporary bubbles of autonomy must gradually turn into
permanent, free communities. However, in order to do so, those
communities cannot exist in total isolation; neither can they have a
purely confrontational relation with everyone around them. They
have to have some way to engage with larger economic, social or
political systems that surround them.'
Such leverage will depend upon new economic and moral changes
embodied in new economic and legal institutions.
At the heart of all this, however, lies a simple structural dilemma:
How can the left fuse the need to actively engage with, but also
create an alternative to, the capitalist laws of value determination
on the world market, while facilitating the associated laborers'
ability democratically and collectively to manage and decide on
what they 2will produce and how? This is the central dialectical
tension.. ..
One possible response is Community Syndicalism - local community
finance and operating credit for industrial production linked with, but
separate institutionally from, democratic worker ownership and
control of production - in short, investment capital assets separate
from enterprise ownership and control. The result would increase
investment directly for production, retain jobs in existing population
centers, promote job skilling, and retain tax bases for local services
and income supporting local businesses, at the same time increasing
support for authentic political democracy by rendering the exploitive
ideology of the public/private distinction superfluous.
After analyzing Community Syndicalism as a moral/economic
model, this article will explore the future viability of worker
ownership or cooperatives in the United States including the law

affecting their viability, identify necessary legal changes in U.S. law,
and outline global legal/political impacts of Community Syndicalism.'

1. DAVID GRAEBER, DIRECr ACTION: AN ETHNOGRAPHY 239 (2009).
2. DAVID HARVEY, REBEL CITIES: FROM THE RIGHT TO THE CITY TO THE URBAN
REVOLUTION 126 (2012).
3. The ascendency of the political Right under the banner of the "Tea-Party" in local and
state government currently in the United States probably makes Community Syndicalism a
political impossibility now. Yet, current conditions underlying the need for "third-way"
solutions will only deteriorate in the mid-term future, and there is no reason to avoid planning
for inevitable change. See David Ellerman, On the Legal Structures of Workers' Cooperatives, in
WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL CHANGE 299 (Frank Lindenfeld & Joyce Rothschild-

Whitt eds., 1982).
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II. STRUCTURAL CHALLENGES TO DEVELOPED ECONOMIES
EMBEDDED IN FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION

Threatening developed economies, the Great Recession resulting
from the globalization of Finance Capitalism created two structural
labor crises for developed economies:
1). The Investment Conundrum: The channeling of substantial
investment into non-productive, speculative, paper commodities,
due in large part to hyper-inequalities in wealth, and entailing
reduced growth of production for use and therefore reduced
available aggregate job creation in the developed economies.
When the finance bubbles burst, more than 11,800,000 jobs were
lost in the United States alone, and this jobs gap is not closing with
finance sector bail out and recovery. At present optimistic job
creation rates (which are about double current job creation), it will
take over twelve years to return to pre-recession employment
levels.
2). The Exportation Problematic: The continued exportation of
industrial jobs from the United States to other lower-cost-ofproduction nations, and the outsourcing, automation, just-in-time
production, and speed-ups associated with investments, spurring
dispersion of global supply chains to create excess global
productive capacity.
Beyond short term corporate incentives (greed) to exploit low wage,
underdeveloped regions, excess capacity will reinforce lower
standardized wages worldwide. In turn, this will make new investment
in production and therefore jobs in developed countries more
unlikely in the future.
As a result, local communities and regional populations in the
United States have destabilized, and even collapsed, with many
attendant social problems. Of course, all structural economic change
will be accompanied by dislocations associated with local economies;
however, recent dislocations due to job loss have not proven to be
subject to temporary readjustments. Twenty years after the 1980's
recession,
4. John B. Foster, The Financializationof Accumulation, MONTHLY REV., Oct. 2010, at 1,
1-17. This impact was noted as early as 1986. Dan Swinney & Jack Metzgar, Expanding the Fight
Against Shutdowns, 9 LAB. RES. REV. 99, 102 (1986).
5. Michael Greenstone & Adam Looney, The Great Recession's Toll on Long-Term
Unemployment, BROOKINGS (Nov. 5, 2010, 9:50 AM), <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/
jobs/posts/2010/11/05-jobs-greenstone-looney>.
6. Foster, supra note 4, at 10.
7. See MICHAEL GREENSTONE & ADAM LOONEY, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, AN
ECONOMIC STRATEGY TO RENEW AMERICAN COMMUNITIES 5-8 (Brookings 2010); WILLIAM
JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE URBAN POOR (1996).
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[t]he net loss to a displaced worker with six years of job tenure is
approximately $164,000, which exceeds 20 percent of the average
lifetime earnings of these workers. These future earnings losses
dwarf the losses associated from the period of unemployment
itself.... [J]ob loss also has negative economic and noneconomic
effects on workers health, their families and their communities.
Men with high levels of seniority when they are displaced from
their jobs experience mortality rates in the year after
unemployment 50 to 100 percent higher than otherwise would be
expected... . These elevated rates of mortality are still evident even
twenty years after the job loss and may reduce these workers' life
expectancies by twelve to eighteen months for a worker who loses
his job at age forty.

The children of these workers also appear to suffer. Children
whose fathers were displaced have annual earnings about 9 percent
lower than similar children whose fathers did not experience an

employment shock.'
The collapse of the mortgage market as a result of the bursting of
the securitized mortgage bubble has worsened the personal welfare of
workers in declining communities by making their houses unsellable,
making re-location to communities with available jobs of any kind
infeasible.o
Some may wonder why a neutral observer should care about
welfare declines and local destabilization in developed countries and
certainly the United States? If not just desserts, then at least for

developing countries as recipients of new capital flows creating jobs
formerly located in developed economies, their citizens' welfare is
increased even as the new job holders are exploited by payment of

substandard wages under substandard conditions of production.
Something is better than nothing, which is of course what capital
managers are counting on. There are two reasons to care:
1). Economic: Stabilizing production to some extent in developed
economies slows the now frenetic race to the bottom of labor
standards promoted by capital managers playing developing
countries against each other.
2). Moral: An economic enterprise model needs to be established
and proven that changes the priority of incentives based on
production for use. The goal is not profit maximization but
economic stabilization.

8.

GREENSTONE & LOONEY, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, supra note 7, at 7-8.

9. Id.
10. Id. at 8.
11. Patricia Hanratty, Response, 15 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 141 (1986-87)
(discussing eminent domain and responding to Joseph F. Hornack & Staughton Lynd, The Steel
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The first reason is both macro-economic and morally distributive in
the long run. The second reason is micro-economic in incentives and
rationality but moral as well in redefining rights to work, mutuality of
relations, equality, and democratic participation. What is required is a
change in economic agency, not the abandonment of markets at this
time.
III. COMMUNITY SYNDICALISM AS A MORAL/ECONOMIC RESPONSE
TO STRUCTURAL DISLOCATION

Community Syndicalism will not be a quick fix. The key to
breaking the conceptual roadblock to reversing local economic
decline is to institutionalize the incentive to invest in job maximizing
production that maximizes long-term stability and continuity of those
jobs, and minimizes short-term profit seeking at the expense of longterm stability. Investment incentives must be turned upside down.
Furthermore, these new investments largely will have to be from the
distressed locality to that same locality. Outsiders won't be interested.
(This may seem like squeezing blood from a stone). Furthermore,
regarding hoped for economic spinoff of new local production, known
as the local strategy of import substitution, "the base for the
healthiest and most sustainable growth is the development of
increasing numbers of firms that buy from and sell to one another as
they create a labor market with increasingly skilled workers and
technical and professional people."1 Thus, first, the incentive to
invest needs to be collectivized locally so that investment flows are
not solely directed by short-term return to individualized investors.
"[S]o long as we treat the public good of investment as a private forprofit activity coordinated by individual banks and investment
companies[, 'Speculative finance' [Hyman] Minsky argues, is the
problem; reliance on financial markets creates economic instability
and discourages real innovation and investment." 3
In Community Syndicalism, local community start-up finance
and operating credit for industrial production combines with, but is
separate from, linked democratic worker ownership and control of
2

Valley Authority, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 113, 115-16 (1986-87)).
12. WILLIAM FOOTE WHYTE & KATHLEEN KING WHYTE, MAKING MONDRAGON: THE
GROWTH AND DYNAMICS OF THE WORKER COOPERATIVE COMPLEX 59 (1991) (citing JANE
JACOBS, CITIES AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1984)).
13. Gerald Friedman, The Crisis and the Economists: A Guide to the Perplexed, 51 LAB.
HIST. 345, 352 (2010).
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production. Community funding and ownership, coupled with worker
control was the intent behind the closest attempt proposed in the U.S.
thus far - the Steel Valley Authority's attempt to use the public
power of eminent domain in the Pittsburgh region during the 1980s.14
Community Syndicalism differs in two important aspects: First, the
aim is not takeover of failing or closing plants as with S.V.A.; second,
splitting community investment in and ownership of capital assets
from worker ownership and democratic control of the enterprise
contribute synergistically to long-term viability. Both the community
(economic base) and the workers (sustainable jobs) desire
stabilization in the labor market." The "private" capitalist economy
may be driven by short-term maximization of return, but Community
Syndicates assume long-term viability.
How can this new model be generated? Start with the economic
problem. Local communities or regional populations have been
devastated by the decline of industrial production, whether the
disappearance of enterprise that formed the economic base of those
communities resulted from competitive failure or by outsourcing of
some or all of the production from the affected area. Community
economics of course are not limited to the base firm. Hundreds of
small businesses, community non-profits, local taxes for services, even
big-box retailers, and supply chain production, depend upon resident
incomes. "A dearth of good jobs in distressed communities leads to
high unemployment and stagnant wages. Evidence shows that certain
place-based policies can help attract business investment to targeted
areas and can boost the productivity and wages of workers in those
areas."16 The key is jobs, and not just minimum wage jobs, but jobs
that approximate the number and wage level of the production drain.
Moreover, to rekindle the local economy, new jobs need to be
anchored to the community.
Employee ownership helps anchor capital in local communities
because employee-owners usually reside in the community in which
they work and their interests, as residents and employee-owners,
coincide with those of the community. Employee ownership is
therefore a valuable tool for aiding economic development
14. Joseph F. Hornack & Staughton Lynd, The Steel Valley Authority, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 113, 114-16 (1986-87).
15. See generally William H. Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. REv. 1335
(1991).
16. Adam Looney & Michael Greenstone, Leave No Community Behind, BROOKINGS
(Oct. 8, 2010), <http://www.brookings.edu/researchlopinions/2010/10/08-communities-greenston
e-looney>.
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strategies which value both the geogrphic stability and the quality
of employment opportunities created.
For a counter example, computerized service jobs can always be
easily relocated to another community. What is needed is the
formation of new production creating large numbers of jobs within
modern, flexible production modalities. Existing capital formations
are unlikely candidates as the source of the necessary new
investment.
Will it work? There is reason to believe that much
deindustrialization and job exportation is driven by short-term profit
and inability to compete in world financial markets.
Many plants are closed not because they fail to make a profit, but
because they fail to make enough profit to hold the decisionmaker's
interest when compared to some other marginally more profitable
opportunity. When management fails to reinvest and modernize,
productivity and profit margins most often do decline, thereby
reinforcing the initial, casual decisions whose rhetoric often either
places blame at the feet of labor, or speaks of these developments
as if they constituted some natural and inevitable evolutionary path
beyond anyone's control.
High wages, retained earnings, but no profit requirement, coupled
with high productivity, could allow such syndicates to be market
competitive and achieve long-term supply chain relations, especially
within non-profit global production networks."
Those left behind thus have strong economic incentive to act but
no clear agency. For example, the economic spillover effects on
community economies are not captured by the private investor
market.20 The community or region needs capital pooling. Traditional
sources include local industrial revenue bonds, state abatements or
investment funds, and grants from non-profits. The Naugatuck Valley
Project in Connecticut created a revolving fund to support worker
buyouts from credit unions, churches, unions, and other institutions.
These sources, however, have been substantially diminished since the
17.

Deborah G. Olson, Employee Ownership: An Economic Development Tool for

Anchoring Capital in Local Communities, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 239, 242 (1986-

87).
18. Fran Ansley, Standing Rusty and Rolling Empty: Law, Poverty and America's Eroding
IndustrialBase, 81 GEO. L.J. 1757, 1764 (1993).
19. Frank Lindenfeld, Workers' Cooperatives: Remedy for Plant Closings, in WORKPLACE
DEMOCRACY

AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 3,

at 337, 338; Dan Swinney, Worker

Ownership:A Tactic for Labor, 6 LAB. RES. REV. 99, 106-07 (1985).
20. Greenstone & Looney, supra note 5, at 13.
21. Jeremy Brecher, If All the People Are Banded Together: The Naugatuck Valley Project,
9 LAB. RES. REV. 1, 11 (1986).
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initial enthusiasm for financing worker buyouts of failing industries in
the early 1980's waned. State and local tax incentives to private
enterprise may result in initial private enterprise investment but have
not captured those enterprises long-term because such incentives do
not change community against community race-to-the-bottom
dynamics,22 either economically or legally.23 Yet, there may still be
unused land or buildings available in unfinished local industrial parks.
The Tri-State Conference on Steel in Pittsburgh has proposed land
trusts owning land and buildings, leasing to private enterprises.24
More likely, capital contributions would have to be raised by
rolling but not permanent taxes on business franchises in the area.
Local private banks may be induced to participate by providing longterm, low interest loans if local residents are willing to withdraw
personal and business accounts from banks declining to participate.2 5
Businesses paying franchise taxes might not object to participating in
pooled leverage because they are already "paying" in another way.
When you lose 1,000 manufacturing jobs, you lose an additional
1,000 jobs in the service economy. You put the following service
companies out of business: 17 eating places, 13 food stores, 11 gas
stations, 6 apparel shops, 3 automobile dealerships, 2 hardware
stores, 2 drug stores, 1 sports store, 1 jewelry store, 17 doctors and 5
dentists, and 26an unknown number of teachers, government
employees, etc.

IV. THE COMMUNITY IN COMMUNITY SYNDICALISM

First, a local mechanism is needed for taxing those enterprises
expected to benefit from new production and jobs in advance of those
benefits to provide for initial investment. This is difficult where the
workforce is divided into local municipalities, sometimes crossing
state borders. After long negotiations this obstacle was overcome via
a unique provision of state law under the Tri-State Steel Valley
Authority in the 1980s. The authority was empowered to acquire
failing steel plants through eminent domain and continue production

22. Greenstone & Looney, supra note 5, at 16; see also Mark Crouch, Job Wars at Fort
Wayne, 9 LAB. RES. REV. 47, 50 (1986).
23. Charter Twp. of Ypsylanti v. Gen. Motors Corp., 506 N.W. 2d 556 (Mich. App. 1993).
24. Staughton Lynd, From Protestto Economic Democracy: Labor-Community Ownership
and Management of the Economy, in BUILDING BRIDGES: THE EMERGING GRASSROOTS
COALITION OF LABOR AND COMMUNITY 259 (Jeremy Brecher & Tim Costello eds., 1990).

25. Brecher, supra note 21, at 9, 11.
26. Mike Stout, Reindustrializationfrom Below: The Steel Valley Project, 9 LAB. RES. REV.
19, 20 (1986).
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through an agreement to fund acquisitions agreed to by nine
supporting communities. Some plants were targeted, but none were
ultimately operated by the Authority. Initial steel plants targeted for
eminent domain takeovers by the Authority ultimately were not
purchased because of a failure of funding, particularly for investing in
new plant equipment to make the plants competitive, reinvestment
ignored by prior private ownership bent on milking the plants until
the inevitable end.27 Building up an ongoing tax value capture
structure admittedly will be difficult politically given the collective
need to bet on the future, but in an economically declining
community there is little real choice other than abandonment.
A special tax and borrowing jurisdiction would be needed. Such
specialized political institutions have frequently been established to
govern water distribution in the Western United States.2 This local
community investment fund under democratic elected management,
legally limited to investing in local syndicates would control pooled
resources. Initial capital needs would likely be great because the
purchase of production technology would be necessary to generate
numbers of jobs. It is key to make the investment fund debt
obligations minimal. Furthermore, after start-up, additional capital
must be raised to provide operating credit. Raising the capital pool
and creating the community district to hold the capital assets would
solve the main barriers to entry for successful industrial worker
ownership cooperatives by separating investment capital needs from
enterprise returns and providing a reliable source for ongoing credit
draws. These twin barriers have led to most worker ownership and
control market failures in the United States."
It is crucial that the politics of governing the investment pool
funds should be institutionally separated from short-term changes in
political party leadership of the community in general. Many
Community Development Agencies have foundered by succumbing
to short-term political forces structured into the enterprises that were
developed by the CDAs. 0 Short-term demands and political log
27.
28.

Id. at 27.
Dwight R. Lee, Political Provision of Water: An Economic/Policy Choice Perspective,

in SPECIAL WATER DISTRICTS: CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE 51 (James N. Corbridge, Jr.,

ed., 1983).
29. JOHN CURL, FOR ALL THE PEOPLE: UNCOVERING THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF
COOPERATION, COOPERATIVE MOVEMENTS, AND COMMUNALISM IN THE UNITED STATES

351-352 (2009).
30. Sherman L. Kreiner, Worker Ownership as the Basis for an Integrated, Proactive
Development Model, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 227, 235 (1986-87).
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rolling involved in general policymaking should not intrude on the
single-minded, long-term resolve of enterprise stability. In instances
where local entities have sat on the boards of cooperatives in return
for funding support, the results for the cooperatives have not been
positive, except perhaps in the housing area."' The special district
should be restricted to using its funds in support of local, cooperative
enterprises. Funds must be available for both asset investment and
operating capital lines of credit. Perhaps a minimal amount of funds
could be authorized for other investments in order to assure funds for
the district's own operational needs. Leasing of the district's assets
must be guaranteed for the duration of the enterprise in order to
prevent the district from withdrawing capital assets earlier on purely
political grounds. Determination of the point of enterprise failure
triggering district asset recapture would either have to be specified in
creating the district or in the terms of the lease requirements.
Why would communities want to generate substantial capital
pooling? Most directly, for survival: to recreate a tax base, to save
small businesses and community organizations such as churches, to
reduce the servicing costs of social morbidity. While lacking economic
agency to support worker ownership, political agency is longstanding:
"This movement includes community organizations, urban political
organizations, religious organizations, unemployed organizations, and
others who are responding to the reality of very high levels of
unemployment."3 Secondarily, the community would acquire new
assets in the form of land, buildings, and machinery. The investment
fund would have title to these capital assets unless bought from it
later by the worker enterprises themselves. In the case of enterprise
failure, the fund would have these basic assets to begin anew.
Eventually, it might be hoped that worker and enterprise deposits
would grow to support a subsidiary mutual bank that might be the
source of future investments without taxing the community. In 1959,
four years after the first cooperative was established in Mondragon,
Spain, the corporation created the Caja Laboral Popular, which has
grown to become the fourth largest bank by assets in Spain."
2

31.

Howard Stanback, Response [to Richard McGahey], 15 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.

CHANGE 83, 83-84 (1986-87).

32. Swinney, supra note 18, at 107.
33. Alessandra Azevedo & Leda Gitahy, The Cooperative Movement, Self Management,
and Competitiveness: The Case of Mondrag6n Corporaci6n Cooperativa, 13 WORKING USA 5
(2010).
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V. THE SYNDICAL IN COMMUNITY SYNDICALISM

Splitting asset ownership from enterprise ownership is the
conceptual advance of community syndicalism. Once planning by
political communities and potential worker groups have identified a
viable long-term market niche, an investment pool can be initiated.
At this point or shortly thereafter worker organizations may form
coalitions to "bid" (by virtue of viability of proposed business plans)
on the value of the enterprise. The capital assets of the fund would be
"leased" at nominal value for the period of the enterprise's existence.
The workers initially or subsequently employed would own the
enterprise on a one share, one vote basis and generate any necessary
management committee by democratic choice. Worker ownership
and control not only permits but is crucial to stability. "If employees
own the firm, they will not shut it, or move it to Mexico, after a
disappointing quarter, or a failure to meet a growth target, or simply
because they have failed to attain a 30 per cent market share." There
should be no incentives created to allow the local community to pull
out capital assets or for workers to view participation as a transitory
job rather than continuing ownership of the enterprise. Thus day-today management could be delegated under periodic democratic
oversight meetings. This organizational model worked reasonably
well in the Northwest plywood cooperatives."
To structure the legality of worker enterprise ownership, little
needs to be done. Virtually all states have already modified their
incorporation statutes to allow licensing of cooperative ownership.36
Modifications of organizational management subject to owner control
useful to the specific enterprise can be established voluntarily in
corporate bylaws." Long-term nominal leases of assets and provision
of financing in subsidy of local production is also standard practice.
There is no policy reason except resistance by private enterprises to
new competition to prevent extension of favorable national and local
tax treatment given to other employee ownership forms such as
34

34. Alan Hyde, Ownership, Contracts, and Politics in the Protection of Employees Against
Risk, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 721, 748 (1993).
35. Katrina V. Berman, The Worker-Owned Plywood Cooperatives, in WORKPLACE
DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 3, at 161.
36. David Ellerman & Peter Pitegoff, The Democratic Corporation: The New Worker
CooperativeStatute in Massachusetts, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 441 (1982-83).
37. Scott L. Cummings, Developing Cooperatives as a Job Creation Strategy for LowIncome Workers, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 181, 201 (1999).
38. Id. at 204-05.
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ESOPs.
By eliminating the need of the enterprise for more than variable
cost coverage including relatively high monthly distributions to
workers (replacing wages), plus some retained earnings for
production improvement and flexibility, the enterprise should gain
cost competitiveness against private enterprises forced to produce
world competitive (not minimum) short-term profits for investors39
and the coverage of initial asset investments for start-ups, even where
competitors gain their advantage from low wage labor exploitation.
Following the Mondragon experience, a parallel "social council"
structure (or union) would mediate any differences arising between
workers as owners and workers as workers. However, such
differences, while perhaps inevitable about short-term value
distributions as opposed to long-term retained earning reinvestment,
are likely also to be reduced by eliminating the ownership/employee
legal separation."
Another and linked problem to be addressed legally involves
maintaining worker management, which has proven problematic in
production cooperatives in the United States. Professor Henry
Hansmann has predicted the failure of industrial production
enterprises
managed democratically
based
on substantial
coordination costs of large corporation management. ' The more
specialized and hierarchical the internal division of labor, and the
greater number of workers involved in industrial production, the
greater the coordination costs (informational and divisional)
occasioned by democratic forms. He is willing to concede consumer
service delivery and shop based small scale firms can more easily
overcome these transaction costs and survive if their capitalization
costs are also relatively low - everyone tends to do the same thing
and debt can be retired more quickly easing turnover problems.42 But
small-scale enterprise is not the aim here. Undoubtedly, there is some
truth to the transaction costs of democratic decisions, and that is why
direct democratic micro-management of day-to-day production
decisions is impossible. However, Hansmann discounts offsetting
productivity gains due to worker input and productivity gains due to
4

39. Lindenfeld, supra note 19, at 338.
40. WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 19, at 38-41, 146-49.
41. Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPS, Law Firms,
Codetermination, and Economic Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1749 (1990).
42. See Alan Hyde, In Defense of Employee Ownership, 67 CHI-KENT L. REV. 159, 169
n.35 (1991).
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ownership and loyalty stakes in the enterprise. Historically, "For the
same level of capital investment, the cooperatives had far higher
labor productivity than comparable capitalist firms."43 In the plywood
cooperatives, worker owners often were rotated through different
stages of production in order to educate each owner about the
enterprise as a whole.
[B]roadly speaking, it is those clusters of [Producer Cooperatives]
with the most cooperative features - particularly the plywood and

cooperage PCs - that have the longest life, the best economic
performance, and the best record of maintaining a cooperative
structure over time.4
As is well known, the Mondragon cooperatives engage in extensive
worker education and also utilize interacting and overlapping
hierarchies of democratic decision-making.45 Of course this is costly,
particularly in terms of time, and generally goes without full
compensation of management decisions. Just as maximizing shortterm profit is not necessarily the most important goal of economic life
unless we choose to embed it in law, so is absolute minimization of
transaction costs not inscribed naturally. Nothing more has been
established but that democracy and equality have some allocation
costs.
Related to firm management, a more technical legal problem is
workforce transitions or enterprise labor turnover. The main benefit
of enterprise ownership is job stability and perhaps an increase in the
number of stable jobs. Indeed one of the aims of separation of asset
ownership and enterprise ownership is to remove the incentive of any
cohort of worker owners to liquidate the capital assets of the
enterprise and cash out the enterprise.46 Alternatively, enterprise
value is mostly found in the income stream. This in turn reduces the
magnitude, but doesn't eliminate the problem of share transfer. In the
past, cooperatives have sometimes repurchased owner shares at
current market value for owners who were leaving or retiring or
deceased. 7 The purchased shares are then sold to new workers or
4
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45. See generally WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 12.

46. Aditi Bagchi, Varieties of Employee Ownership: Some Unintended Consequences of
Corporate Law and Labor Law, 10 U. PA. J. Bus. & EMP. L. 305, 307-09 (2008).
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retained by the enterprise with returns apportioned to remaining
owners pro rata. However market repurchase can escalate to
prohibitive prices, particularly related to capital asset appreciation.
Escalating market value of shares often forced sale to non-worker
shareholders, and over time the enterprise returned to ordinary stock
corporations. 8 Given split ownership, that is not a cognizable option
for community syndicates. Other cooperatives such as Mondragon
have stabilized the share price for longstanding and new jobholders,
but created undistributed share accounts for each owner that increase
with longevity or value contribution.49 When a shareholder eventually
severs their connection to the cooperative, the accumulated
individual fund is paid out. In some sense the worker's accumulation
operates similarly to a defined contribution pension fund in the
United States (although Mondragon workers have an additional
pension fund). This plan allows movement in and out of the
cooperative but also has drawbacks. This approach does not consider
risks undertaken by early worker-owners and fails to compensate
owners for the appreciation in the value of the enterprise over time
except as accumulation based on labor time. It thus depends on a
strong culture of commitment to cooperation that may be diminishing
among younger entrants.
The project of job stability based on enterprise stability should
not incentivize easy exit. That is part of the tradeoff justifying
replacing lost local jobs, an assumption of lessened mobility. If the
community has bought in, the worker-owner can be expected to make
a similar commitment foregoing some degree of mobility. "Legal and
economic arrangements that make it more difficult or costly for
parties to withdraw from the relationship may serve as safeguards
that induce firm-specific human capital investments by reducing the
risk of subsequent opportunistic withdrawal."o Of course, this idea
cannot justify involuntary servitude. But perhaps a sliding scale exit
penalty reducing market value repurchase payout could be justified
based on length of service to the firm, at least if exit is not due to
retirement or incapacity. Of course, nothing prevents an enterprise
generating surplus revenues successfully earned above costs and/or
periodic and generous distributions from also funding defined
payment accumulation accounts. Also, there is justification for some
4

48. See infra note 55.
49. Johnson & Whyte, supra note 47, at 184.
50. Simon, supra note 15, at 1393.
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share appreciation for well-established enterprises, because new
entrant worker-owners are taking less risk and early workers are
more likely to have made sacrifices in distributions stemming from
early debts incurred in establishing supply chain connections and
reputation. Furthermore, the lack of appreciation of share value
equity may be less disruptive within the Mondragon core area
because of the extensive acculturation of workers before they join a
cooperative enterprise. Share control and turnover can be part of the
enterprise bylaws, but some limitation on transferability may need to
be legislated to respect community capitalization and aggregate job
stabilization.
The new enterprises should not be thought to be static. In fact
production flexibility should be planned into the enterprise from the
beginning to adapt production inputs, process, and products to
changing markets. Worker-owners whose jobs are eliminated or
technologically changed should be retrained and assigned within the
enterprise with costs covered by normal attrition. That too will
enhance labor force stability.
VI. THE PAST FAILURES OF WORKER COOPERATIVES IN THE
UNITED STATES Is LARGELY A PROBLEM OF ACCESS TO CAPITAL
Worker cooperatives have historically only been able to succeed
in the United States in limited sectors for limited periods. The longest
surviving cooperatives have clustered in small, service delivery, or
small-scale consumer production firms." Curl estimates that there are
roughly 300 worker cooperatives currently operating in the United
States. In such firms, initial capitalization may be low and
coordination of management costs among a small number of workers
also low, with little hierarchy associated with specialization.
Attempts to sustain large industrial cooperatives have failed
most directly for three reasons:
1). Economics of start-up: In the 1970's, worker ownership,
sometimes as cooperatives, were pushed as a way of buying out failing
industries where no other buyer emerged to continue the enterprise,
and thus the workers' jobs. This was cooperative by desperation.
51.
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Predictably, failing industries usually failed, sometimes because of
former ownership stripping of assets or neglect of re-investment or
paying of investor dividends instead of retained earnings.52
2). Access to operating capital: Early cooperatives in the
nineteenth century and more recent industrial attempts have failed
not because initial capital could not be found, but because additional,
conventional credit lines could not be secured for short-term
production costs or modernization.5 3 Private banks, by and large, have
more profitable short-term loans available, or at least perceive loan
options as less risky.
One of the major difficulties faced by worker cooperatives and
worker owned firms has been access to financial capital.
Without the ability to borrow for purposes of meeting short
term cash flow needs or long-term expansion, these firms have
faced substantial difficulties in surviving and competing in the
marketplace.5 4
Both some truth and some self-fulfilling prophecy lead to bank
choices.
3). Legal inflexibility in transition: Especially large cooperatives
face difficult issues with labor attrition or turnover. Existing laws and
the accompanying economic incentives often force marketable
worker ownership shares to revert to non-participant shareholders.
Over time the cooperative reverts to a public stock corporation. This
has been the fate for many of the plywood cooperatives in the
Northwest United States.
It should be clear that these are barriers to success of any large
worker owned and democratically managed enterprises.
Note this article does not consider individual worker stock
purchases or the sham ownership involved in the increasing number
of Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs), even those owning
(but not controlling) a majority of stock shares. By splitting
ownership (workers) from control (remains with management)
ESOPS have been primarily used as anti-takeover or last-ditch capital
raising devices, often in failing enterprises.5 6
52.
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Nevertheless, the political structure of federalism in the United
States makes past successful organizational examples of worker
ownership elsewhere more or less inapplicable to what would be
needed in the United States, as well. The paper thus casts some doubt
on the universalization of the Mondragon experience in developed
country contexts, while applauding the Mondragon example, sharing
its aims, and adapting its practices where context is favorable. In
contrast, Community Syndicalism:
1. would be located in locally distressed and deindustrialized
communities;
2. would not be subsidized from the regular state budget;
3. would most likely be aimed initially at creating single
enterprises aside from cooperative networks;
4. would not raise capital from workers, who after all are
unemployed in distressed communities;
5. would still depend on the state budget for pensions and
social insurance for workers;
6. would require all employees to be or to become owners;
7. would be established with no connection to the educational
system, and aside from being in distressed communities, face hostility
from the larger society; and
8. would have to learn different relations contrasted to the
adversary nature of the larger culture's normal management/worker
hostility.
But if this model catches on, won't communities not in decline
turn to Community Syndicalism and by competition reduce the value
of the new model? First, such a defeat is devoutly to be wished for
(despite the great success of the Mondragon system, cooperatives
have comprised less than 1 percent of the Spanish economy). Three
results would follow. One, economic incentives would switch to
maximize long-term stability (better for the world and earth)."
Second, the public versus private realm distinction underwriting
massive worldwide wealth concentration and inequality would be
undermined (as if public resources were not used to underwrite
private wealth accumulation already by differential taxing and
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subsidy).5 9 Such public subsidy in "profitable" communities would
then be in direct political tradeoff with job creation and community
stability. Third, the experience of something approaching full
democratic participation at work is likely to be a spreading malady
leading to greater democratizing of political participation in nonmarket arenas. "Clearly, a strong case can be made for bringing
greater democracy into the workplace in order to create a citizenry
that participates in all of the major areas affecting its daily
circumstances and its future."60 Too many tears would not be shed for
private capital. Furthermore, traditional short-term competitive
return may well be appropriate for high-risk production, research and
development, organizational or product innovation, and other
economic sectors, and thus likely to continue.
Some leaders in the labor movement decry worker ownership
because worker owned firms are claimed to pacify workers as owners
and undercut union wages.6 1 However, this outcome is unlikely to
follow where worker managed enterprises are a) created to inhabit
long term market niches generating relatively high wage jobs and b)
generated in failing communities, particularly where unionized
employment has previously fled. Ownership of enterprise
democratically managed in fact may well increase social militancy.
Such a development becomes more practicable, of course, with
the expansion of networks of such firms, for example in Basque
Spain. As of 2008, the network of cooperatives centered in
Mondragon, Spain contained "106 cooperatives, with 97,773 workers,
and a total invoice of 15.6 billion euros." 62 However, even with single
enterprises in a local community, extensive planning and market
analysis by independent intellectual cadres would be necessary to
support workable community syndicates given the costs of potential
failure of such enterprises, the inability to easily diversify, and the
need to build-in production flexibility and adaptation for long-term
job preservation. The major difficulties in reaching systemic
networked outcomes are mainly political - coordination costs of
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multi-location divisions of enterprise labor within global supply
chains. These coordination issues have certainly been of great recent
concern to the Mondragon cooperative network.63
VII. CONCLUSION

Community Syndicalism is not a panacea for local communities
destabilized by job loss. It is simply an alternative model of economic
enterprise organization as yet untried. The United States cannot
simply replicate Mondragon given the lack of an established internal
bank or financing mechanism from within a larger cooperative
structure, outside any existing cooperative network or cultural
experience, and facing hostility from the educational system under
separate federal jurisdictions, and within an adversarial society
committed to individualistic capitalism. But within the margins of
desperate distressed communities, under mostly available local legal
mechanisms, it may be possible to demonstrate a different moraleconomic alternative, paralleling the Mondragon strategy.6 By
splitting asset ownership from enterprise ownership, it is possible to
re-incentivize production for long-term stability of aggregate jobs;
refocus on production for use; provide the tax and economic base for
local institutions; localize participation in globalization of product
markets and reduce the race to the bottom of labor standards;
increase the experience of democratic participation affecting other
areas of social life; and put the lie to the fictional public/private
distinction underwriting inequality. Even under Tea-Party control of
current politics, it is not a utopian project to begin what will follow.
We need to make persuasive and feasible what is to be done.
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